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Article 6

Steven Folmar Wake Forest University

IDENTITY POLITICS AMONG DALITS IN
NEPAL
In challenging, “the popular belief that castes that are considered impure according to the Brahmanical hierarchy, nevertheless participate willingly in their own degradation,” (Gupta 2004, 410,
see also Moffat 1979) Gupta suggests that the social action in which Dalits engage is poorly understood. Similarly, in Nepal, Dalit issues remain in the nearly invisible undercurrent of contemporary identity politics. This paper examines micro-level identity politics as they relate to the Dalit
jats, Kami, Sarki and Damai in Central and Western Nepal. The paper attempts to fill in some of the
uncharted area of local political action by depicting various strategies employed by Dalits to negotiate local political landscapes. Several dimensions of Dalit identity strategies are examined including inter- and intra-jat processes, the politics of inclusion and exclusion and the politics of anonymity. Manipulation of caste identity includes strategies making use of origin stories and manipulating
inter-caste boundaries. Specific techniques involve alternately asserting and obscuring identity via
collective actions of political organization and openly challenging caste structures to shifting use of
last-name identification, assuming higher jat status, and using powerful social positions (e.g. faith
healer) to override inter-jat restrictions and to lay claim to resources normally withheld from Dalits.

INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the little-understood question of
Dalit1 identity politics in Nepal. A major controversy
is whether Dalits have internalized their low status
so much that they reinforce it through their behavior.
A brief review of recent literature on Dalit status
suggests that in India this issue is still unresolved
and in Nepal it is barely of interest to scholars. In an
attempt to illuminate questions of Dalit social action
at the local level, I flesh out dimensions of identity
politics, including a set of actions I call the politics
of anonymity (and related strategies), to attempt to
further comprehend Dalit resistance to their social
oppression. Three still-open issues are salient:
· The degree to which Dalits are still subject to
social and political oppression.
· The degree to which Dalits “participate willingly
in their own degradation.”
· The social and political strategies Dalits employ
to deal with degradation.

SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON DALITS2
The earliest ethnographies to include details of
Dalit life in Nepal did not appear until more than
two decades after Nepal was opened to the west and

the ethnography of Nepal was flourishing. Caplan
(1972) and Borgstrom (1980) examined the effects
of local politics on inter-caste relations with high
castes and Hofer (1976) published an account of
smithy among Kamis. Not until the 1990s was there
an expansion in ethnography specifically focused
on Dalits. Much of this focused on specific ritual
roles, such as shaman (Maskerinek 1995), Damai
musicians (Tingey 1994) and Gaine minstrels
(Weisethaunet 1998). Cameron’s (1998) examination
of the status of women of several low-castes in far
western Nepal is remarkable for its focus on daily
routine. I have recently contributed to literature on
hill Dalits, examining how they are marginalized
by higher status caste and ethnic groups in the
processes of development and tourism (Folmar
2004, 2005, 2008). Parish (1996) examined caste
structure and resistance to it among the Newars of
Kathmandu Valley. More recent interest comes from
Nepali scholars whose foci are on the application of
research to development concerns by Bhattachan,
et al. (2002), Dahal, et al. (2002) and Kisan (2005),
himself a Dalit. This list of publications is quite short
when compared to similar reviews for the high castes
or for ethnic groups in Nepal.
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The challenge of working with Dalits
Research on Nepal’s Dalits has been sparse, partly because
of the personal challenge of working among them. A similar
difficulty is found in India, where scholars have demonstrated
a very real, personal aversion to “the method,” as Moffat (1979)
calls living among Dalits. He noted that the prospect was so
daunting that, after having set up residence in a Dalit village,
he nearly forsook his research:
I was not at the time…prepared for the psychological stress of
the method, and after about three months of intermittent residence in the Parangudi Harijan hamlet, I left the village and the
region with the intention of abandoning my fieldwork in India
(Moffat 1979: xxiv).

Moffat eventually decided to live outside the Parangudi
Harijan hamlet. Even from a distance, he encountered
problems of social stigma that interfered with his work. The
very idea that he wanted to understand the culture of Dalits
was considered “outlandish,” by locals (xxviii). The major
obstacle was that contact with “untouchables” impeded access
to people of clean castes. Two and a half decades later ClarkDeces (2005) would encounter similar difficulties in Tamil
Nadu and in order to manage considerations of purity and
impurity chose not to reside with the Dalits she studied.
Cameron, confronted by the same difficulty in her study of
low caste women in far western Nepal, lived with a high caste
family, reporting, “I had to make many concessions to continue
with my research” (36). She “had to obtain permission
from [her] landlady before the low caste interviewee would
be allowed inside [her] quarters,” (36). Tingey (1994) too
decided to forego the option of living in the home of a Damai
musician, the group with whom she was working, in favor of
staying with Newars, who were higher in status. So unusual
is it for ethnographers to live among Dalits that when my
students and I stayed in Jharuwarasi, a low caste village in
Kathmandu Valley, a television station found it worthy of
doing a story on us for that very reason.
Each ethnographer must consider the payoff when making
such a choice. As Dalits do live in a caste system, studies
of their social standing must be conducted with reference
to the other, higher status groups. For Tingey (1994) and
Cameron (1998) living among high castes restricted their
access to the Dalits who were the central focus of the work.
This was also a concern for me in Sirubari in 2002, when I
attempted to understand the intricacies of Damai involvement
in the local Gurung-run Village Tourism Project. In an odd
living arrangement of rotating among Gurung households
every other day, I had to reach out to the Damai musicians
by making twice daily trips to Damai Tol, a pattern that
then restricted my access to important, high status Gurungs.
Actually living among Dalits makes access to higher status
individuals even trickier. Living in Jharuwarasi among
Dalits conferred automatic Dalit-like status to me and created
situational ambiguities difficult to negotiate with elites, such
as gaining entry to areas forbidden to Dalits, in particular tea
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shops. As a consequence of having this status conferred on
me (although in no way as onerous as actually being Dalit),
I gained some insight into the social and psychological
challenges their status entails.
Dalits as non-issues in scholarship on Nepal
The study of Dalits of Nepal has also been secondary to
other scholarly concerns. One approach, which will be
mentioned only briefly here, is to consider Dalit issues in
Nepal as contributing little to what we can learn through the
robust interest in Dalits of India3. Another is to view Dalits’
concerns as secondary to current issues of global interest to
the academic community or to emergent socio-political events
in modern Nepal; in contrast, Dalit issues are seen as chronic
and perhaps uninteresting.
As political and social events of the last decade of the 20th
century unfolded, Dalit social issues remained mired in an
ethnographic no-man’s land. This was true even though the
social problems that suddenly gripped scholarly attention
had characterized Dalits for ages. An upsurge of interest in
women’s issues mirrored a global urgency to address feminist
issues. During the same timeframe, another global concern
was to quell the spread of HIV/AIDS, leading to plentiful
funding and scholarly activity. The Maoist uprising provided
a compelling, local, social phenomenon for academic
attention. There is no argument about how important these
and other issues are and, ironically, Dalit status was related
to all of these. In gender issues, Dalit women are recognized
as doubly disadvantaged both by low caste and gender status.
Dalits are suggested targets of HIV intervention because of
their high risk profile. Maoist rhetoric referred to issues of
poverty, powerlessness and marginalization, all concerns
for Dalits, who were said to have swelled the Maoists ranks,
although there is no firm evidence to confirm that. Even so,
Dalit issues continued to be swept aside by these more current
affairs – they had the one thing that Dalit issues lacked, the
appeal that comes with the new discovery. Dalit issues are
just the opposite; they are age-old, rooted, some argue, in the
very genesis of the caste system, and identified as a concern
of Indian, rather than Nepali scholarship.
Dalits and caste: Resistance or acquiescence?
Scholars agree that castes are hierarchical, but dispute
whether ranking is based in the symbolic separation of clean
from unclean (Dumont 1970) or in the exertion of economic,
political or materially-based power (Hocart 1950, Quigley
1993). Gupta (2005) recently raised the question of whether
caste is more about identity than system. He asserts that
the caste system has remained fundamentally the same but
that avenues for resisting and challenging it have opened up,
making it more an issue of identity. Beteille (1965) cautions
us not to overlook other hierarchies, such as class, that
operate alongside caste and can either work in tandem with

caste or cut across it, thus weakening it. A focus on Dalits
begs yet another question about whether caste is a unified
system or is composed of several micro-systems of ideology
and social practice (Moffat 1979). No one definition suffices
for caste, since it describes a wide range of cultural situations
across time and space. The caste system has such social
potency and ability to resist change (though change does
occur) because it is all these things, symbolic and material,
one system and several, overlapping other hierarchies such
as class, race (Hangen 2005), gender (Cameron 1998) and
even modernization (Bista 1990). Beteille notes that until
recently caste was a system of cumulative inequalities: in
“the traditional structure the cleavages of caste, class, and
power tended much more than today to run along the same
grooves” (1965: 4). In reinforcing each other, they were far
more difficult to resist.
This view of “traditional” systems of caste has led scholars
to accept the marginalization of Dalits uncritically. According
to Karanth, by stressing “institutional similarities among the
Untouchable castes and the so-called ‘higher’ castes scholars
like Dumont and Moffat attribute a passive acceptance of
low status by the former” (2004: 138). The view that Dalits
thus reinforce their low status is consistent with self-identity
theory, which posits that in any hierarchical social system,
“low ranking people often feel they have a stake in the
hierarchy…a lowly position and a strong sense of duty are
neither incompatible nor contradictory” (Hatch 1989: 351).
But the pivotal moment in Dalit history in Nepal was the
imposition of untouchability, pani nachalne, onto low castes,
as defined by the Rana rulers in the Muluki Ain of 1854 (Hofer
1979). According to Kisan (2005), an organized Dalit social
movement began at least 60 years ago, in 1947, to oppose
their degradation.
Gupta has recently reviewed this issue for Indian Dalits
(2005) and edited a volume exploring how they relate to people
of higher caste (2004). In these pieces, he and his colleagues
challenge Moffat’s (1979) thesis that untouchables accept
their low status and act in ways to reinforce it. A process that
is said to exemplify internalization of self-degrading behavior
is Sanskritization, wherein low castes replicate practices of
higher castes. But this is a matter of interpretation. It could
also be argued that copying the behavior of elites is a way
to elevate status. The biography of Dr. Ambedkar, whose
emulation of high caste behavior initiated the entire Dalit
social movement in South Asia would attest to that (see
Jaffrelot 2004). By the same token, the meaning of other socalled self-degrading acts can cut both ways. For instance,
one can construe passive resistance of the kind described
by Parish (1996) as self-debasing or as a subtle exercise of
subversive power.
In a recent study of low-caste musicians in Tamil Nadu,
Clark-Deces (2005) shows how behavior both accepts and
resists low status. Dalits in Tamil Nadu tell the story of
Virajampuhan, the first Paraiyar, at the cremation grounds.
The telling “is neither cathartic nor elevating, as is the case

(at least partly) in dirges and death songs, but restrictive and
downgrading” (Clark-Deces 2005; 131). She goes on:
To the question of how they felt about their lowly condition…
men replied that they were not angry, because the great god Siva
had fated them to be Paraiyars. As one petitioner told me, ‘God
created me in this caste. I have no resentment (kurai) about
that. Who I am today is god’s creation and design (ClarkeDeces 2005; 132).

The dirges, however, are densely multivocal; they praise
patrons (104), “secure esteem” for the singer (105), provide
an arena for competition among singers (106-107) and teach
lessons (115). They are tragic and comic (115) and, in fact,
are so irreverent that by singing them, men strive to, “tip the
hierarchical world of the Tamil day-to-day life in their favor,
even if their caste is low” (121).
This theme, of the subversive masked by subservience,
continues one established by Freeman in the landmark
personal history of the untouchable, Muli (Freeman 1979).
Muli frequently contributed to his own misery, not because
he willed it, but because of structural barriers to his
advancement. Following on Berreman’s assertion that, “no
group of people is content to be low in a caste hierarchy”
(1973, 405), Freeman explains: “Mulmi and other Bauris
have failed, not because they embody expectations of failure
or accept their lot, but rather because the Bauris face social
and economic disabilities that they are presently powerless to
change” (1979: 397).
The same is true of Viramma (2002), a Dalit woman who
describes how she and other Dalits silently accept restrictions
on their singing by high caste patrons: “When we work for
the Reddiar, there’s no question of us singing. We keep our
mouths shut out of respect for the Reddiar” (2002: 191).
But:
Towards midday, as soon as the Reddiar goes home to eat, I
start up with the first song. After our husbands, the Reddiar
are the people we respect and fear the most. We are their serfs.
It’s different with other landowners, we sing as much as we
want and anyway, they like it. Sometimes when we work for
the Naicker, we joke with him. We can even make fun of him
(2002, 191).

The relationship between structural control and latitude for
open resistance becomes clearer in her remarks that, “We
make fun of Brahmins as well” because “Brahmins own
nothing…apart from Temple land. We never go work for
them, they employ only Kundiyanar. That’s why we can
make fun of them” (2002: 192).
Social and political strategies
The social and political strategies Dalits employ in everyday
life to bow to, quietly accept, dissent to or resist high caste
domination are numerous. At times a single action embodies
several goals, even polar opposites, behaviors that seemingly
accept the system but subtly challenge it.
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A primary form of dissent, according to Karanth (2004)
is replication, which has been viewed by others, including
Ambedkar (Jaffelot 2004), as acquiescing to low status.
However, Karanth argues that it is the economic system of
patronage in village Karnataka that maintains economic and
ritual hierarchy, not the act of replication. Empirically, this
point is played out at the town well, the use of which is a point
of contention between untouchable Holeyas and landowning
Okkaligas. One Holeya says, “After all, my people live here
and I do not want to antagonize the members of other castes.
But I am hopeful that the Okkaligas will realize that the old
order is changing and will stop treating us the way they are
doing now” (Karanth 2004: 156). But Karanth comments that
the dominant prevail: “if [the Holeyas] oppose the ideas of
segregation as prescribed by the dominant and ruling faction,
they are not likely to get what they want,” (2004, 158).
Moffat (1979) sees replication quite in the opposite way of
reinforcing low status. By thoroughly copying the institutions
that Brahmins bar them from, Dalits further marginalize
themselves from the system in which they seek membership.
This view depends heavily on Moffat’s assumption that
Dalits and Brahmins share one cultural system (Gellner
2001). Karanth (2004) disagrees; replication is not a form of
acquiescence to a low status position in a seamless social ethic,
but is a strategy of dissent. People who perform service can
disagree with the system, but may have little power to resist
it. Regardless of caste, village headmen and elders vigorously
uphold a social system that serves their own needs. Cameron
(1995) concludes similarly, showing how Dalits select Bahuns
to perform their rituals – through married women’s natal
male relatives. Although this might appear to be replication,
it is in fact only so in that Dalits get the ritual work done;
otherwise, they sidestep caste Bahun authority.
In my experience, Dalit views of self depart significantly
from how high castes view them. Although the Bahun may
recoil at the mere thought of taking food from a Dalit’s hand,
the Dalit is not reluctant to make such an offer, for he does not
think he is dirty or achut, but recognizes that others see him
this way. The offer is not one merely of food but as a chance
to negate notions of impurity.
Because of acts like this, Dalits are often described as
anti-establishment, in that they resist Hindu hegemony by
turning to deities that reign beyond the central moral order,
and drawing power from sources that defile the high castes
(Kinsley 1993). One particularly powerful and potentially
subversive Goddess is Kali. The subversive elements “of Kali
worship have long been at the core of the religious practices
and world views of aboriginal, Tantric, low caste, and village
traditions,” (Caldwell 2003). Devotion to Kali is widespread
among low castes, precisely because of her subversive nature,
her destructive capabilities and her potential to transform
society. Kathmandu Valley contains the holy shrine of
Dakshinkali, where the masses sacrifice to her and which
validate certain local forms of shamanism and faith-healing,
ritual positions of power open to Dalits. Shamanism and
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faith-healing are conducted as such and are examples of Dalit
attempts to wrest power for themselves though innovative
practices of resistance to an unmerciful social order (see, e.g.
Maskerinec 1995).
Another way to resist caste hierarchy is to reconfigure Vedicbased origin stories into jati puranas (Gupta 2005), which
posit an origin of caste equality. The latter openly question
Brahmanical claims to high status and challenge the validity
of hierarchy. Alternate origin stories are not uncommon.
Badri (2004) recounts, for example, how Dalits create stories
that realign present day claims to status through valorizing
the past. A case in point, the story of Uman Devi honors
Dalits’ place in history and legitimizes their present. Even
Moffat (1979) records the story of Aadi Draavida, the
primordial Dravidian, claiming the position of the first born
of caste ancestors. In a similar vein, Dalits, reject Hinduism
outright in favor of other religions favoring equality, such as
Buddhism, sometimes believed to be the original religion of
Dalits (Jaffrelot 2004).
In another cultural domain, Agrawal (2004) describes how
caste can be reordered through the manipulation of kinship
rules. These rules are designed for central moral codes, not
codes of prostitution, the caste-based occupation of Bedia
women. Through artful twists of caste logic, Bedia claim high
jat status for their offspring sired by high caste men. In quite
a different manner, Quigley (1993) and Gray (1995) touch
briefly on how naming and manipulation of kinship identity
are employed both as a means of assigning and resisting caste
identity in Nepal, a topic that is explored below.
Another area of resistance is physical space, made exclusive
by constructing symbolic and physical boundaries to exclude
low-status individuals from high status areas. Beteille (1965)
shows how the physical structure of the village in South
India mirrors its power structure: “the agraham … is not
only a cluster of habitations, but also the centre of social
life for the Brahmins,” whereas, “the Pallacheri…is not just
another quarter of the village; it is a place which no Brahmin
should enter.” I have also observed how higher status groups
manipulate geography to exclude Dalits (Folmar 2008) and
by so doing, create spaces that Dalits control because of their
potential to pollute the pure. Low castes control their space
by a sort of proxy power relinquished to them by people who
want to avoid its capacity to pollute. Ironically, that which
defines Dalits as low and powerless imbues them with the
subversive power of untouchability. A Brahmin who enters
Pallacheri risks becoming defiled and hence barred entry to
Brahmin-only spaces.
Three features of cultural geography, tea shops, water taps
and temples are the focus of changing inter-caste relations
in Nepal today (see Kisan 2005) and figure significantly in
current identity politics.

Dalit oppression
There is no simple answer to the question of whether Dalits
are achieving social equality in Nepal today. The current
legal code prohibits caste discrimination, but, as Kisan
(2005) points out, they are not enforced and have loopholes
that allow for continued oppression on numerous grounds.
Often the conversation centers on whether a specific change
signals deeper, more fundamental shifts in the social fabric of
Nepal. Speculation falls into three categories: that material
improvement is possible despite caste affiliation, that Dalits
now have access to occupations they once did not, and that
restrictions on specific prohibitions are easing. All these are
true; I have seen examples of each, but it is just as easy to
conclude that very little is changing and to employ the same
examples as evidence.
These discussions point to the complexity of what constitutes
real change. Toppling the caste hierarchy into a set of distinct
but socially equal identity groups is not expected by anyone.
Nearly three decades ago, Kolenda concluded that for Dalits
of India hierarchy was not vanishing; “untouchables are
not advancing as rapidly as the legislated quotas originally
forecasted” (1978: 132). If anything, in Nepal, change for
Dalits lags behind India. Nepal’s Dalits lack the political
force to instigate meaningful change and for many Nepalis,
the goals are less grand, formulated as a desire to loosen the
system up for individual- and group-level social mobility.
Ideas that have traction focus on tangibles, like educational
and occupational opportunities. Key symbolic changes in
oppression, such as access to once-forbidden cultural spaces,
in particular temples, tea shops and wells, working in jobs
once unattainable and side by side with non-Dalit colleagues
without fear of discrimination are debated. They are argued
over both as evidence for positive social change and as
examples of superficial changes that obscure the fact that
things are changing very little. This theme, that evidence is
ambiguous, pervades my observations from working among
Dalits in Nepal.

DALIT IDENTITY IN NEPAL: DESCRIMINATION
AND EQUALITY4
I now summarize ethnographic observations I have made
on issues of Dalit agency, or their culturally constrained
ability to act (Ahearn 2001). For Dalits, agency is referenced
specifically in relation to people of higher and dominant
status, including castes and ethnic groups. It also refers to a
particular kind of socio-political action that is akin to identity
politics, within which sphere I will discuss the multiple ways
identity is illuminated and claimed as well as how it is altered
and even masked, and how each action is employed as a
strategy to regulate relations with others. I call the altering
and masking of identity, the politics of anonymity. Its overt,
tactical structure is opposite to identity politics, and the two
can work at cross-purposes, that is, masking identity can
be viewed as thwarting the goal of asserting rights through

identity. I specifically address two interrelated topics. One is
how Dalits conceptualize their status as Dalit and the other is
how they manage their behavior toward other jats, especially
those higher in the social order. First though, I set the stage
by briefly assessing the broader socio-political climate in
which Dalits struggle to acquire an “equal” standing among
other groups in the caste system.
Caste and equality in Nepal
Eliminating social and political barriers to low castes (and
others, such as women, janajati, etc.), is one of the salient
issues of the day. In today’s activist social climate attaining
equality is frequently discussed. Nepal has been highly
politicized for as long as I have worked there, beginning in
1979. Even then, in urbanizing Pokhara, Dalits of Damai Tol
voiced an intense dissatisfaction with their low standing at
the time of the Referendum of 1980 on the multiparty status
of the government. One interview I had with a Damai man
in his 30s particularly stands out. Although my project only
dealt peripherally with inter-caste relations, it was prominent
in his mind. His comments centered on the injustice in the
many restrictions heaped upon low caste people. He peppered
his remarks with reference to the equality (barabar) he felt
was inherent in all people, essentialized by the sharing of one
blood. “Mero ragat chha. Bahunko ragat pani chha. Mero haat
khatera ragat auncha. Bahunko haat khatera, ragat pani auncha.”
(I have blood. A Brahmin also has blood. When my arm is
cut, I bleed. When a Brahmin’s arm is cut, he also bleeds).
In the nearly three intervening decades, the Dalit cause has
been taken up on official and informal fronts. The Government
of Nepal includes the improvement of Dalit social, economic,
educational and political status in its Tenth Five-Year Plan, in
which social justice for Dalits is officially designated as a goal
deserving of an entire chapter:
All around development is possible only if multi-ethnic groups,
multi-lingual and various groups and communities within the
country develop in proportionate manner. Such type of development will help to utilize their inherent skill, ability and
knowledge in the national development process on the one
hand, and on the other, assist to uplift the living standard of
the Dalits, neglected, downtrodden and oppressed classes by
creating employment opportunities through the mobilization of
local resources (Government of Nepal 2002, 28:1).

Although the plan does not precisely define Dalit, the
government has established a National Dalit Commission
to protect Dalit rights that were granted legally in 1963.
The plan advocates a joint effort to offer social justice to
Dalits via a strategic goal urging, “the government, NGOs,
and private sector, to put an end to caste discrimination by
identifying discriminator situation against dalit community
(sic)” (Government of Nepal 2002, 28:3). Efforts to identify
the specifics of discrimination against Dalits have been made,
notably by Dahal, et al. (2002) and Bhattachan et al. (2003)
who show that it remains pronounced and includes over 200
specific ways of discriminating against Dalits.
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Changes in Status
Although this paper is about social and political status it is
important to comment briefly on economic status. Dalits are
among the poorest groups in Nepal. The Dalits with whom I
have worked mostly fall into that category and their poverty
is quite visible. Many rural and semi-urban Dalits are either
landless or have too little land to support themselves. Houses
tend to be small and of one storey, constructed from earth and
stone even in areas where higher castes are quickly modifying
or building houses with modern materials. In Sirubari, where
many Damai are unemployed, households piece together a
family economy from numerous jobs. The same can be said
of Damai and Sarki living in Jharuwarasi. Although in these
locations some people prospered more than others, I have
visited other areas in which entire neighborhoods are quite
poor.
Economic change is visible for Dalits, though it is not simple
to assess; it entails a plethora of variables among which both
economic improvement in some cases and decline in others
can be seen. One of the most poverty-stricken places I know
is the tiny neighborhood of mixed low caste in Ghandruk,
called Naichitol. In 2003, the people I met lacked jobs,
food, adequate housing and health, and kept children home
from school because they lacked the paltry amount of cash
needed for supplies. Although I only glimpsed it in 2007,
the neighborhood was visibly improved. The dirt courtyards
had been paved with slate and the staircase up to the main
thoroughfare had been improved. Unfortunately, however,
visible improvement often hides the cases in which people
have been driven further into poverty as I discovered in
Sirubari in 2002 (Folmar 2005). The unpaved road to the
village was extended there at the expense of a number of Dalits
for the meager landholdings of several families lay entirely in
the path of the road. In the absence of their husbands, wives
were pressured to sign land away without understanding what
they were doing. In the same village, however, electricity was
extended to the Dalit houses that could afford it. One man
acquired a television while I lived there.
Changes in economics similarly have mixed effects on social
status, as illustrated by Ravi, a Dalit man who drove a car
in a government car pool, a job he would have been denied
until recently. He asserted that he was treated as equal to all
the other drivers even though he was the only Dalit in the
pool. It later became clear, however, that he obscured his
identity from the other Nepali drivers by maintaining social
distance from them. That he masked his identity, rather than
asserting it, calls for a different interpretation of how caste
relations have changed and to what degree Ravi’s situation is
evidence of change. The question that puzzles us is whether
Ravi improved his status by using the tactic of anonymity or
did he compromise the quest for equal status by failing to
identify himself as Dalit.
Ravi’s tactic also raises the issue of how ready high castes
are to extend to Dalits access to once-privileged positions

46

HIMALAYA XXVII(1-2) 2007

and places. Hari, a high caste associate, has debated this
point with me, positing that it is Dalits’ reticence that
bars their entry to shrines now legally accessible to them.
This reticence is something in the minds of Dalits, an
internalization of their low status. Hari admits that there is
the “one side” of whether the high caste person will allow
Dalits access, but more relevant is this “other side:” whether
the Dalit can overcome the embodied low status and exert
his right to enter. Many high caste people and janajatis claim
that they do not discriminate, but when confronted with the
opportunity to grant equal treatment to Dalits, they do not
transgress established boundaries and opt rather to maintain
them. Hari affords us two further instances of this reluctance.
When in Ghandruk in West Nepal, Hari had spoken several
times of his desire to move beyond inter-caste restrictions,
which he felt were wrong on moral grounds. However, when
a Dalit offered him cooked potatoes, he visibly balked. After
some hesitation, to his credit, he acted in concert with his
principles and took the food. He later confessed to me that
this was a psychological hurdle, but that he was motivated to
overcome it because of his association with me.
A parallel example is offered from the village of Jharuwarasi
from 2007, among Sarkis, who talk often of strategies to
improve their caste positioning. People readily pointed out
that the situation had improved since my first stay there
in 2005. One Bahun was singled out as exemplary of how
high caste people now accept Dalits and interact with them
as equals. This man, Acharya, had a janajati wife and lived
near Sarkigaon. Sarkis claimed that they and Acharya freely
entered each others’ houses and during holidays could share
meat, showing that sanctions on food sharing were easing.
These changes are important, but in this case, they did not
signal an abandonment of restrictions in caste regulations.
In Acharya’s presence, Sarkis took the passive role in
communication, except for one man, KB, whose story will
be outlined later. Moreover, all the Sarkis present, even KB,
addressed Acharya with the English honorific, “Sir.” On
several occasions, KB also confided that he did not agree
that Acharya fully accepted Sarkis as equal. Nor did he
completely trust Acharya. Later, KB admonished me not to
stay long when I visited Acharya’s house, not saying why, but
conveying distrust in his whisper.
Another case of the disjunction between public discourse
of equality and asymmetrical social relations was visible in
the words and actions of politically active young Dalits of
Jharuwarasi. One such person is Arjun a strapping young
man who works in the Middle East most of each year. He
noted that social oppression was easing as Dalits improved
their economic status, became Christian and obtained
education. All these changes weakened the power of caste
and diminished the need to identify oneself as Dalit. The
logic that followed was that if one was not Dalit, then one
could behave as non-Dalit in tea shops where the low status of
Dalits was indexed by Dalits being barred entry and by their
being requested to wash the glass from which they drank.

With some bravado, Arjun and other assertive Dalits claimed
that they can now enter tea shops and refuse to wash their
glasses. In order to verify their claims, my colleague tested
the issue by asking people to visit tea shops with him, but
even the most vocal often refused to do so (Perry 2008).
In Jharuwarasi in 2007, women could attend classes in
social mobility offered six nights per week by the Federation
for Dalit Women, which is funded by the Communist Party.
At one such meeting a leader recommended that rather than
wash glasses they had used Dalits should break, then pay for
them. Attendees have, again, not translated this strategy into
action. Reluctance to do so is tied up in the uncertainty of
the outcomes as told of in stories of Dalits being punished
severely for opposing caste restrictions.

DALIT MODELS OF IDENTITY AND IDENTITY
POLITICS
Local Model
Every new venture – and especially one that challenges ageold social norms – has risk attached to it. Twice Rajiv pointed
out to me that “everything is experiment.” The first time was
when we spoke about his experiences with starting a business
in the city. Just before I left the field in 2005, he had sold his
tea shop to his uncle, KB, using the profit to open a lunch
counter at a school in Patan, where he was assured that the
hundreds of children would eat daily. By 2007, the business
failed. There were far fewer students than had been estimated
and most of them carried lunches. Rajiv chuckled, shrugged
his shoulders and told me, “Everything is experiment.” His
current business experiment, a small gift store in Patan, is
faring much better.
He proffered the same assessment of the NGO he and other
civic-minded Dalits established during our stay in 2007.
The ad hoc organizing committee and I had lunch the day
we filed the papers to set up Animation Nepal and spoke of
our hopes that it would become a conduit to economic and
educational development for the Dalits of Jharuwarasi and
elsewhere. Referring to a book we were planning, I spoke of
the several small markets I thought might be available to us
but cautioned that we could fail as easily as succeed. Rajiv
intoned, “Everything is experiment.” A simple and basic
philosophy is summed up in that short phrase. Upliftment
is practical, empirical and based on trying out uncertain
ventures. When they fail, another attempt follows. Plain but
elegant, this approach is the central theme of the pursuit of
development by this community, the right to which, as the
next section shows, is intrinsic.
Origins: Vedas or Jati Purana?
The Sarkis of Jharuwarasi have their own version of the
origin of their caste and of the caste system, retold by KB as
he located his jat in the caste system and described the Sarkis’
fight to attain social equality. The tale goes like this:

A mother, in the beginning, had three sons. Kaancha Bhote thyo;
Maila Sarki thyo; Jetho Bahun thyo. (The youngest was a Tibetan;
the second was a Sarki; the eldest was a Brahmin). The Bhote
was a lama (priest), and the Sarki was a cook. One day, a cow
died and Maila and Kancha conspired to cook the cow and to
feed it to their Brahmin brother. Once the food was prepared,
the two of them put it out for all to eat, which Maila and Kaancha did. Jetho, however, did not eat, as he was fasting that
day. When Maila discovered that his elder brother did not eat,
he became furious. He took the intestines from the cow and
beat his elder brother with them. The intestines wrapped over
Jetho’s left shoulder and under his right arm and became janai
(the sacred thread now worn by Bramins).

This, KB claims, shows that Bahuns came upon their high
status illegitimately. The story reconfigures sacred time, the
original nature of the castes, the active role of Sarkis in creating
the caste system and the substantiation of subversive methods
in challenging it. The story is a dynamic between Bahuns, the
elite of society, and others low in the caste system represented
by the Sarki and those outside the system, represented by the
Bhote. At first, all are equal, different jats living together as
brothers in the primordial family, ranked only by birth order
(the Bahun is eldest). The younger brothers employ trickery
to attempt to get the eldest to break the implied taboo against
eating beef. The subversion fails, but only serendipitously,
through the passivity of the Bahun, not through his intellect
or effort for he was not even aware of his situation. His
intellect is trumped by that of the Sarki, whose subversion is
validated as the original method of resistance. It is through
covert action, not open challenge, that his righteous attempt is
channeled. The ultimate result is partial, but not total failure,
for the Bahun wears a symbol of purity composed of material
he cannot come into contact with, thus invalidating his claim
to his lofty and pure position.
In addition, KB asserts that Brahmins “stole the Vedas
from the Sarkis,” the original keepers, in which symbolic
implements are intrinsically linked to the shoemaker’s tools
of today. This account provides the foundation for modern
day caste relations, in which Brahmins dominate by forcing
others into undesirable occupations and by refusing to eat the
beef prescribed for Sarkis. Keeping Dalits uneducated and
poor, Brahmins intentionally work to oppress them and to
thwart their efforts to uplift themselves.
KB does not embrace the viewpoint that Dalits help to
oppress themselves, but claims that they lack any vehicle
by which to change their position. Here is where KB rightly
detects a difference between his older generation and the
younger generation to which Rajiv belongs. Where Rajiv is
more inclined to organize, lobby and advocate through group
action, KB takes individual, subversive action to reverse the
injustice of caste.
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Jharphuk
KB’s personal history is one actively confronting the
unfairness of the caste system, but it is an individual story
for the most part. In it, KB recounts numerous incidents in
which he and his family were abused by people of high castes
and his actions to redress those wrongs. The list of indignities
began early in life, when after his father died, KB’s mother
worked hard for a Bahun family pounding rice and receiving
little in return. She died sewing clothes for someone else’s
family, not her own. Later in life, KB himself worked for a
Bahun family, earning very little. When his infant daughter
became ill, he asked the Bahun for a loan for a cab ride to
see a doctor, but was refused. “He would not lend me even
16 rupees.” Even when she was so ill that she was “put on
a haystack,” that Bahun was unwilling to lend him money.
“Maybe, if we could have bought medicine or taken her to a
hospital, she would not have died.” KB quit working for this
man, telling him, “I will not work for you, not even for one
lakh [100,000] rupees per day!”
At age 26, KB apprenticed himself to a well-known jharphuk,
a type of faith healer, from Lele, several hours walk away.
Deeply intelligent and socially minded, KB built fame and
influence as a healer. His clientele comes from near and far
and includes people of all statuses. Bahuns are more likely
to consult KB than they are the Bahun jharphuk who lives
close by. From this position, KB wields ominous spiritual
power and is free to tread on caste prohibitions. When
offering his services KB calculates how deeply caste values
are embodied in his high caste clients and pushes them past
their comfort zones. If, for example, when visiting a Bahun’s
home to diagnose or treat an illness, KB demands entry into
the house and if the Bahun displays too much discomfort,
KB insists that he visit every room. This forces the Bahun
to purify every room rather than just one. Similarly, KB
often gives people water to drink in the course of a ritual
treatment. Again, if the Bahun is loath to take a drink from
a Sarki’s hand, KB admonishes him to drink the entire cup,
rather than just a sip. Such measures provide KB avenues to
exert his own equality, or even superiority among groups that
would otherwise degrade him.
Like KB, Bika has struggled against the indignities of his
low status to uplift his family. He lives in West Nepal, in
the Annapurna Conservation Area, where ethnic Gurungs
dominate development and tourism. He did the unheard of
by opening a hotel, owned by a Kami and not by a Gurung,
on a major trekking route. Although not prohibited from
such an endeavor by traditional caste sanctions, Bika has
endured violence several times as a result, not from Brahmins
but from Gurungs. The most brutal attack was in the middle
of the night, when perhaps a dozen masked men stabbed him
repeatedly and wrecked the hotel’s restaurant. He survived,
however, rebuilding his dining hall and continuing to defy
the oppression that others would subject him to.
Bika’s case contrasts with KB’s, whose awesome spiritual
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power protects him from assault. Bika’s bold business venture
was risky because of his identity as a Dalit and because he
lacked allies to support and protect him. Not many have the
courage to embark on an action that challenges the domain
of a more powerful group, especially without supporters. His
hotel is distant from any Dalit community and his actions are
similarly distant from normal Dalit actions, embarked upon
alone.
More common is the subtler strategy of passive resistance. It
is key to coping with the burden of oppression, such as when
a tailor in Sirubari seizes a moment of control by purposefully
making a Brahmin patron wait a day longer than expected
for new clothing or tacitly agrees with the Gurung leader
who admonishes him to urge his fellow musicians to save
the money earned from musical performances for tourists
but later confides that he doesn’t care if tourism dries up
because there is no benefit from it (phaida chaina). Through
the constant application of subtle subversive pressure, Dalits
thread together a tapestry of resistance that can appear as
acceptance.
The younger generation increasingly opts for open challenge
to the system, often emulating heroes that directly confront
caste authority. This is exemplified in Ram’s account of
how he followed the alleged actions of a highly placed Dalit
politician, who, to get his point across about rejecting the
food sharing prohibitions, touched all the food at a banquet
so that high caste attendees either had to go hungry or eat
food touched by an untouchable. Ram employed this strategy
in an Army dining hall, where he, one of the few Dalits at
the mess table, did the same, forcing his fellow clean-caste
soldiers to eat defiled food.
Ram and a small group of young people in Jharuwarasi employ
a proactive, committee-based model of civic action borrowed
from other groups seeking political capital, such as the
janajatis. Political, economic and social committees abound
in Jharuwarasi. They include micro-credit groups, groups that
teach social advancement strategies, groups that educate older
women and groups that come together to organize, fund and
conduct community-wide projects, including the formation of
the aforementioned Animation Nepal. There are at least half a
dozen organized committees and groups intended to address
issues of development and social upliftment among the
Sarkis and Damais of Jharuwarasi. These include a “Father’s
Group,” “Mother’s Group,” a chapter of the Federation for
Dalit Women, several micro-credit groups, and Animation
Nepal. Except for the formal link to the Federation for Dalit
Women, the connection between local level Dalit associations
and ones organized at the national level is difficult to assess.
There is a great deal of awareness of national organizations
and it is common to hear informal discussions of the same
issues engaged in at the national level.
Locally-based Dalit organizations are common in some
villages and among some Dalits and tend to be focused on local
concerns. For example, community-based musicians groups
are a necessary aspect of many rural Damai communities that

provide traditional music for weddings. Damai musicians in
Sirubari are plentiful enough to have two musicians groups
there that work on a cooperative basis. They also have a
“Father’s Group” as well as a “Mother’s Group,” each of which
addresses more general community concerns, such as how
income from tourism will be doled out. Their neighbors,
the Kamis, are less organized; according to Gurung contacts,
there is no Mother’s Group among them. Whether there are
many organizations or not, most group action is over local
concerns and appears not to be formally connected to national
Dalit associations. However, local groups do share the goal of
advocating for Dalit rights through collective actions akin to
classic definitions of identity politics.
Identity Politics
Identity politics can be defined as:
…demand for recognition on the basis of the very grounds on
which recognition has previously been denied: it is qua women,
qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups demand recognition. The
demand is not for inclusion within the fold of “universal humankind” on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it for
respect “in spite of” one‘s differences. Rather, what is demanded
is respect for oneself as different (Kruks 2001, 85).

For Dalits, identity politics is complex and involves the
establishment of various levels of identity, as a specific caste,
such as Sarki, Kami or Damai, or as the shared identity of
Dalit. Dalit is an ambiguous identity to which not all low
caste people aspire. Negotiation over Dalit identity is an
ongoing process. In Jharuwarasi, there are frequent debates
about whether it is good to be called “oppressed,” and there
are those that reject being Dalit on that premise. Counter to
that stance is the desirability of being Dalit as it condenses
several groups’ power into a unified identity that can bring
much force to bear on social improvement. At the political
level, the meaning of Dalit for some people refers to anyone
who is oppressed, whether by caste status, gender, economic
status, age, disability or any other attribute that brings
discrimination. For Dalits who are Dalit by caste there is
sometimes a sense of entitlement to that status and a desire
to bar others from using the designation. KB claimed that
“janajatis lobbied with us to be included as Dalit, but we
refused them,” because, in his view, Dalit is connected to
caste. But, whether it is better to be identified as Sarki or
Dalit, Damai or Dalit, or to find a new identity are questions
that are still to be resolved.
At the heart of the issue of Dalit identity is the entanglement of
oppositions, i.e., the self-definition of Dalit as essentially equal
coupled with others’ identification of Dalit as inferior. Some
people distance themselves from the label Dalit because of
this entanglement The multiple meanings of Dalit, including
who counts as Dalit, leads to choices about pursuing social
equality through asserting a Dalit identity with its claims
of essentialized equality or obscuring one’s Dalit identity in

order to access equality as a non-Dalit. Inclusion as different
is a tricky issue among Dalits as the utility of identity politics
is contingent on individual and collective goals and which
identity best serves those goals. I now present a variety of
uses of identity politics, actions in which Dalits engage while
claiming caste or Dalit identity.
Organizing for protest
Organizing committees and groups is a central, collective
strategy for fostering a better life among Dalits. Local
organizations consist of afno manche, an inner circle of
associates (Bista 1990), who share common goals and
familiarity with one another. Such committees are organized
for various reasons, some related to material or financial
development and others focused more on social advancement.
Local chapters of organizations like the Federation for Dalit
Women (FDW) employ the Dalit label publicly and strategize
on methods that can be used to demand recognition, in ways
entirely consistent with Kruks’ definition of identity politics.
Other organizations are less overt, such as Animation Nepal,
organized by and for Dalits, but not marked as Dalit in its
name. Though it differs in tone and tactics from FDW, the
intent is quite consistent as it seeks resources to improve the
material living standards of its people. Less focused on overt
protest, Animation Nepal nonetheless is aimed directly at
securing the rights that political rhetoric is meant to make
accessible. In a sense, the efforts of Animation Nepal pursue
the outcome that the process of FDW is meant to produce.
Thus, they work in concert to address different aspects of
discrimination.
A similar observation pertains to the existence of other
organized groups that have deeper historical roots and less
overtly political names, such as Fathers and Mothers Groups
or Musicians Groups in Dalit communities. In each of these
cases, the groups are organized internally by Dalits and
composed entirely of them. Their mission is to see to various
administrative and operation procedures that regulate
internal relations and relations with people from other groups
of higher status. The ones I have witnessed are comprised
solely of one jat, such as Damais, and therefore do not pursue
a Dalit agenda per se, but one that advocates specifically
for their own caste. They are generally less explicit about
contesting hierarchy. Their mission and actions appear to be
less about identity politics of the same variety that the FDW
exemplifies, but not entirely distinct from it, suggesting that
identity politics exists in a graded fashion.
Identity and religion
An assumed attribute of Dalits, particularly when they
were thought of as “untouchable,” was their adherence to
Hinduism, the religion that defined their status as low. As a
way to separate Dalits from their justification for low status,
Dr. Ambedkar employed the strategy of renouncing Hinduism
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in favor of Buddhism (Jaffrelot 2004), which advocates social
equality. In Jharuwarasi, nine Sarki households made a
similar shift to Christianity in an effort to distance themselves
from the oppression of Hinduism, which sparked debate over
the power of the different religions to advance development.
Converted Christians claimed that Christianity was an
avenue to success, but people who remained Hindu claimed
that Christianity offered no such benefit. Members of each
religion continued to respect each other and their practices,
sometimes grudgingly. Here the political maneuver of
religious conversion was not to gain equality within the
system as it exists but to ally oneself with an alternate ethic
that competes with the prevailing moral order. This form of
resistance is one of circumvention, rejecting the system while
attempting to operate outside a rule structure one considers
intolerable.
Identity and hierarchy within Dalit castes
I asked KB one day what he predicted for the future of
equality within the Sarki caste, an issue raised by practices
such as religious conversion and others described below. His
view was subtle and complex. KB felt that it was the duty of
Dalits to treat each other as equals, and to change the status
differences that stemmed from the past. KB did not see that
Christianity either elevated or decreased rank among Sarkis
– they all remained Sarkis. At the same time, KB feared that
even within the Sarki community, mainly because of economic
differences, Sarkis might eventually split along clan lines with
the more affluent asserting status superiority. He also noted
that a number of status-based prohibitions exist between
Sarkis and Damais in Jharuwarasi, but he felt strongly that
these should be discontinued. He recalled that, in the past,
Damais were forbidden to enter Sarki houses. But when he
opened the first Dalit tea shop in Jharuwarasi more than two
decades ago, after considering the issue carefully, decided to
allow Damais into it and advocated for social equality ever
since.
Status differences are visible between Dalit castes and conflict
happens at times. In Sirubari there was an ongoing argument
about whether Kamis could refuse to remove Damai corpses
to the funeral grounds, an indication that inter-Dalit caste
relations were in flux there. And these conflicts, the ones that
pit the interests of one caste against another, influence some
people to conclude that Dalit is not the identity they prefer.
The debate over identity involves internal conflicts over the
meaning and membership of the group as well as advocating
for rights with social superiors.
Sanskritization
As discussed above, the act of emulating the behaviors of
the high caste, or sanskritization, can be viewed either as
compliance with the system or as resistance to it. Several
examples of emulation are visible in Jharuwarasi, for example,
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the Dalit community is in the process of constructing two
temples, one to Siva and the other to Ganesh. One could
also count the opening of tea shops about 20 years ago as
an act of replication of a caste-based socioeconomic strategy
employed by Bahuns and Chetris, which also provided
Dalits the opportunity to avoid high caste tea shops and the
discrimination to which they were subject. The most vivid
example of this process in Jharuwarasi, though, was when
Sarkis decided that they would no longer eat beef, in emulation
of other Hindu castes. Only Sarkis ate beef according to
tradition. But KB and others recognize this act as one that
is used to justify their untouchability; discontinuing beef
consumption would remove one source of their stigmatization.
Anyone caught eating beef was to be subject to a significant
fine.
Anonymity
Resistance need not always consist of collective action.
Individuals, like Bika, the hotelier who defied the system in
the Annapurna Conservation Area, sometimes exert their
Dalit identity as individuals, without reference to a committee
or group that will back them up. This is rare. Without a
collective behind them, individuals put their personal safety at
far greater risk and so find other, more subtle ways to subvert
their status. Through masking their identity, individuals are
freer to act against the current of the system, but only in spaces
where their Dalit or untouchable identity is not known.
This type of action, the politics of anonymity, is an adjunct
to identity politics. It entails cloaking one’s identity so that
it is either ambiguous or appropriates a higher status by
suggesting membership in a caste to which one does not, in
fact, belong. Identity politics operates most effectively at the
group level, where the force of numbers makes it possible to
contest one’s low status. Individually, however, it is difficult to
confront the social force behind discrimination successfully
and the more effective strategy is often to deny or obscure
one’s identity in favor of adopting another.
Anonymity, familiarity and place
Buddhanilkantha, the famous shrine of the “Sleeping Vishnu,”
draws large crowds of worshipers regularly. Like many other
Hindu temples that prevent Dalits from entry (Kisan 1999),
only “clean”caste Hindus are permitted to descend the steps
to where Vishnu lies sleeping in a pond on a bed of snakes.
Barring non-Hindus and Dalits is a practice taken for granted
even in the socially progressive climate of Kathmandu Valley
today. However, denying entry depends on either recognizing
the person seeking entry or on undependable visual cues like
skin color, hair type, stature, posture, or dress, all of which
have become less reliable over time. So, personal acquaintance
has become essential knowledge for determining Dalit status.
An interview with a young Damai man, Keshav, who lives near
Buddhanilkantha, clarified the simple but effective strategy

of circumnavigating this prohibition. Dalits avoid having
Brahmins deny them entry to sacred Hindu places, preferring
to visit temples where the priests do not know them. When
Keshav’s relatives visit, the Brahmin priest is unaware of their
Dalit identity and they enter the temple freely. Likewise,
Keshav visits distant temples where his identity is not known,
thus skirting the prohibition. He asserts that this strategy is
in fact common.
Naming
Establishing group identity, advocating its rights and
maintaining its borders are central to the efforts of Dalit
empowerment. As seen above, the identity of Dalits is elevated
via the jati purana they put forth as their origin and for why
the struggle for equality is so intractable. A similar story, at
least partially grounded in fact, explicates how membership
in each paani na chalne caste become concrete by high castes
assigning caste name as surname. As the discussion here will
show, the manipulation of surnames is employed as a strategy,
at times to assert identity and at other times to cloak it as part
of the politics of anonymity, when an individual attempts to
access social and economic resources. A young Damai man
in Jharuwarasi gave me this version of how Dalits came to
have surnames associated with their particular jats, Sarki,
Kami and Damai.
Before we needed to register ourselves or to fill out governmental forms, none were called Sarki or Kami or Damai. A man
was simply referred to as Mohan Bahadur or Ram Bahadur. It
was like this for my grandfather. When he and others went to
a government office where a name was needed, the employee
would ask, “What is your name?” And he would reply, “Ram
Bahadur.” When asked, “What is your last name,” he would not
know what it was and would respond again, simply with his
name, “Ram Bahadur.” But this would not satisfy regulations,
so the Brahmin would ask, “What do you do?” And he would
say, “I sew clothing,” so the Brahmin would write his name
down as “Damai.” In this way, we came to have these names.

This was the predominant naming mechanism used among
Dalits in Ghachok and Pokhara when I first conducted
fieldwork in 1979-80 and essentially what Gray (1995)
reports for Kathmandu Valley. Dalit was not in current
usage at the time and only a smattering of people used the
surname “Nepali,” which was an attempt to mask caste
affiliation. In the ensuing years, the use of Sarki, Kami and
Damai diminished in favor of Nepali as a cover, but Nepali
quickly became associated with Dalits (it was distinct from
the surname, Nepal, which came to be used by some higher
caste people). Even though one might not know which caste
it referred to, it was certain that the bearer of it was paani
na chalne. Over roughly the same time frame, thar (clan)
names emerged as another, more potent option than either
Nepali or caste name for most people. People once called
Kami employed an updated version of their caste name Biswokarma; Damai switched to the thar names of Pariyar or

Das and Sarkis became identified with a variety of thars, six
in the 42 Sarki households of Jharuwarasi alone .
For now, this strategy successfully masks the association
of Achami or Bogati with being Sarki. Such masking offers
an avenue of access that might otherwise be closed. This is
illustrated indirectly by my encounter with a yogi and his
young high caste followers at Sri Santaniswor Mandir, which
rests atop a hill adjacent to Jharuwarasi. One day I was
invited into the temple where the yogi was hosting about a
dozen men, mostly young and high caste. They drank tea, ate
snacks, smoked marijuana and chatted. As they prepared a
new kettle of tea they invited me to enter. They inquired about
my identity and with whom I lived, as my identity would be
related to (but not completely defined by) my hosts. I told
them I lived in the house of a family very near the temple
named Bishunkhe, which none of them recognized. They
quizzed me on its affiliation, “Is that Bahun? Is it Chhetri?” I
denied specific knowledge; they conferred among themselves
but failed to identify its caste association. They settled on the
likelihood that it was Chhetri, probably because they could
not imagine that a Westerner would live with a Dalit family.
Using a thar name is thus a strategy that facilitates delinking
of personal status from caste or Dalit identity, but not totally
or permanently. Like the adoption of the surname Nepali,
the use of thar names quickly enough becomes associated
with Dalit status. Bishwokarma is Kami and this association
is well known. The name Pariyar no longer obscures one’s
identity as Damai. Das is somewhat more effective since it is
also used by Brahmins, but as Kisan (1999) points out, when
a Dalit shares the thar name of a higher caste person, the Dalit
is coerced into using his or her jat name (Sarki, Kami, Damai)
to distinguish him or her from the latter. In time, as the thar
system becomes more transparent, thar names too will cease
to distance Dalits from their caste status and other strategies
will come to the fore.
Co-opting identity
An alternative strategy is to appropriate names from other
castes, and thus their caste identity, at least for specific
purposes. One such case of this is found in the tourist
village of Sirubari, from which a young Damai girl has gained
national notoriety as a pop singer. Because her caste might
compromise her success, she has taken a surname widely
recognized as Chhetri. A key to this strategy is that the
audience has no prior knowledge of her true caste. Essentially
the same method is employed by some Dalits who desire
access to prohibited ritual spaces but who shy away from
claiming it through assertion of their identities.

CONCLUSIONS
We have arrived at a critical stage in the Dalit social movement
of Nepal. It has gathered momentum and employs new
techniques to challenge discrimination. It seeks inclusion
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in national and local political processes, opening economic
and educational opportunities and equalizing social status.
The process is likely to be slow and painful since the existing
structure of the caste system is fastened together by a dizzying
number of beliefs and practices that cannot be addressed all
at once and everywhere. New generations of Dalits have now
entered the process of advocating greater freedom, access and
respect in public discourse. At times their actions are wellorganized and effective, at others they are fragmented and
their effectiveness less certain. This paper has attempted to
outline some of the strategies employed by Dalits to challenge,
subvert, bend or skirt the caste system to individual and group
ends. In particular, it has illuminated previously overlooked
tactics of the politics of anonymity.
More academic attention to Dalits is needed in order to clarify
the micro-level politics of identity and anonymity now being
deployed by them. Incisive research into the conditions of
Dalit life and their efforts to improve their well-being will
speak to important academic issues such as whether Dalits
act to denigrate themselves. This paper suggests that, while
self-deprecation might occur, the greater weight of social
action is in challenging high caste hegemony overtly and
covertly. Other related issues that need greater attention are
the social and political relations between pani nachalne castes,
paying particular attention to hierarchical relations between
them and efforts to equalize them. Attention to Dalit issues
offers us the chance to understand better the caste system and
the place of the people at the bottom of it. It will clarify social
and political processes of marginalized people. More focus
on Dalits will help to enlighten people about the conditions
of the Dalits and bring their struggle into the light. When
we sort this out better, Dalits will stand to benefit by the
efforts of academics and their chances to take a seat at the
table set with equality, fairness and opportunity will improve
immeasurably.
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ENDNOTES
1. There are many definitions of Dalit in the literature and its
utility as an identity label is hotly contested, as Mary Cameron (personal communication) observes. Here I use it to identify a group of
castes from the hills of Nepal, where I have conducted fieldwork,
mainly Sarki, Kami and Damai, most, but not all of whom have
accepted or embraced this term. Other castes commonly included
in this group include Gaines, Badis and others with whom I have
not worked.
2. This review of Dalit literature is necessarily brief, but illustrates
the general lack of attention to Dalit issues. Vasily (2007) offers a
more thorough listing of Dalit publications up to 2005.
3. This opinion is shared with Susan Hangen (personal communication), to whom I owe this observation.
4. The following sections are based on ethnographic observations
made conducting research in Ghachok, Pokhara and Sirubari as
well as during study abroad trips (including research projects) to
Pokhara, Ghandruk and Jharwarasi.
5. Kisan (2005) provides a comprehensive list of the known surnames used by various castes.
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